10 things we've learned from the Lee Rigby murder security service report

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report said it did not consider any of the opportunities missed by MI5, MI6 or GCHQ in the run-up to Fusilier's Rigby's barbaric murder by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale significant enough to have affected the outcome.

Here are 10 things it has told us:

Delay in investigating Adebowale's extremist material
In March 2013, intelligence indicated that Adebowale had sought to disseminate extremist material. A decision was taken not to arrest him due to concerns there was insufficient evidence to charge him. They planned to make further enquiries into Adebowale’s recent enrolment onto an academic course , and they requested checks on Adebowale’s finances. An application to take further measures against Adebowale too nearly twice as long as it should have done and was sent to the Home Office the day before he murdered Lee Rigby. If they had hit their target, MI5 would probably have had these techniques in place in the days before the attack. The committee called the delay - due to resourcing issues - "unacceptable" and said there could be "no certainty" the techniques would not have revealed the men's plans.

Killers' contact with persons of interest across south east London
Adebowale and Adebolajo were in contact with each other as early as 2010. The first time MI5 was aware of any contact between the two men was in April 2012. The pair also had mutual contacts who were subjects of interest to the intelligence services - all but one of whom were based in south east London. The report reads: "The Committee believes that MI5 should consider attaching more significance to the fact of two Subjects of Interest being in regular contact, even when this contact appears to be merely social. However, the Committee recognises that, in this case, the contact between Adebolajo and Adebowale, so far as it is known, did not reveal extremist intent."

Adebowale's contact with Yemen extremist linked to Al Qaeda
Security services failed to report intelligence showing contact between Adebowale and an extremist known as CHARLIE. Analysis of his activities also showed contact with a wide range of extremists, including a Yemen-based individual with suspected links to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula - known as ECHO. This discovery was made through forensic analysis of a telephone number belonging to a mobile telephone which Adebowale had left in the car after the attack. MI5 had failed to request retrospective billing data for the landline at Adebowale’s home address when they were investigating him in January 2013. If they had done so, "this might then have led them to be aware of further discussion between the two about potential extremist activity".

Adebowale's graphic online threats to kill a soldier not passed to authorities
Graphic online exchanges made in late 2012 between Adebowale and a man known as FOXTROT, an extremist linked to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, were discovered after the attack. They showed Adebowale expressing a desire to murder a soldier because of UK military action in Iraq and Afghanistan. Adebowale had not, at that point (five months before the attack), developed a definite plan as to how he might carry it out.  FOXTROT encouraged him and suggested several potential attack methodologies, ranging from a martyrdom operation to use of a knife. The report concluded: "The company on whose systems this exchange took place had not been aware of the exchange prior to the attack. However, they had previously closed some of Adebowale’s accounts because their automated system deemed them to be associated with terrorism – yet they neither reviewed those accounts nor passed any information to the authorities."

Prior investigations on Adebolajo 
Adebolajo was investigated by the MI5 on five separate occasions. In September 2008 MI5 were aware that he was thought to have acquired items that could be used for terrorist purposes. From April 2011 there was a three-month investigation into his extremist activity and attempts to travel overseas. In June 2011 knowledge had surfaced about his involvement in AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who were planning an attack on the West. September 2011 focussed on an investigation into two individuals with whom Adebolajo was in contact and thereafter, another investigation into an associate of his. In late 2008 the Committee found no formal written record documenting or explaining the decision to stop investigating Adebolajo for a period of time and also found no mention of Adebolajo whatsoever. 

Adebolajo’s Kenya arrest and inadequate record keeping
Adebolajo was arrested in Kenya after being assessed as a low level Subject of Interest for a number of months. He was suspected to have attempted to travel to Somalia with five Kenyan youths to join terrorist group Al Shabaab. The SIS and MI5 were not aware he had left the county and travelled to Kenya due to inadequate record keeping. SIS did not investigate his Kenyan arrest any further following the news.

MI5 stopped investigating Adebolajo in 2012
During 2011, MI5 were investigating Adebolajo but, by October 2012, they ceased the bulk of their coverage as no evidence had been uncovered of attack planning. The MI5 told the committee: "Looking back at Adebolajo, we can see an example of somebody who was a determined individual, is entirely capable, as others are, of concealing their intentions from us. In his case, he is an example of somebody who was not deterred by intervention… We cannot see everything, even under intrusive coverage and some determined people can hide and are not deterred, are unfortunately characteristics of the reality of counter-terrorism work that we are dealing with…" In the months leading to the 2012 Olympics, two operations were formally suspended while a new scheme (DANUBE) was developed. This meant that from spring 2012 to late 2013 there was no scheme in place to manage low level Subjects of Interest. Programme DANUBE should have been developed to specifically address previous failures from the London terrorist attacks on July 7, but the committee is convinced this has not been the case. 

Adebolajo's previous "violent incident" in Woolwich and drug-dealing
In November 2012, Adebolajo was part of "a larger group of individuals who were [involved in] a violent confrontation". The Met Police stopped and arrested some of those involved in the violence en route to Woolwich Dockyard on November 6. Because the incident was disrupted, Adebolajo's details were not passed to other units. At the same time, he was known to be making money from drug-dealing. The committee concluded: "The Committee considers that there is insufficient co-ordination between MI5 and police investigations. Disruption based on criminal activities offers a potential opportunity to reduce the threat posed by extremists. MI5 and the police must improve both the process and the level of communication."

Did MI5 try to enlist Adebolajo as an informant? 
Evidence on reports that MI5 wanted Adebolajo to become a contact are not available in the public document. The committee said: "While we would have liked to publish the full facts, given the public interest in such allegations, we have accepted that we cannot comment publicly on the allegations that MI5 had been trying to recruit Adebolajo as an agent, although we have reported on this  matter in the classified version of our Report to the Prime Minister.With regard to allegations that Adebolajo was harassed, we are able to confirm that, during the course of our Inquiry, we have found no evidence that there was any harassment of Adebolajo by MI5."

Too many other investigations 
The report states there was a four-month delay in the MI5 opening an investigation into Adebolajo following his return from Kenya in November 2012. MI5 told the Committee this was due to them opening a trace (a request for a check across MI5 to propose links to Islamist extremist activity) on Adebolajo instead of a lead (A request for all intelligence and information suggesting activities of a national safety concern) and have also said a number of other investigations took priority at the time.